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Social Protection in a Global
Economy: The Case of Pension
Reform in Latin America
Sarah M.Brooks*
I.

Introduction.

Social policy in Latin America is undergoing a profound transformation both in form
and function in society. The roots of this change trace back to the demise of state-led
development models, which crystallized in the debt crisis and economic meltdown of the
1980s. The impact and response to this crisis have led governments to embrace a new economic model based on open markets, international competition and a circumscribed role
for the state. The opening of domestic markets to foreign goods and currency, and the
attendant rise in the quantity of those flows have introduced a whole new array of issues,
actors and constraints to domestic policy-making. With the enhanced ability of owners of
capital to "exit" in response to undesirable policies, the costs of implementing market-correcting social reforms have increased dramatically.'
Nowhere is the weight of this international economic constraint more strongly felt
than in the capital-scarce nations of the developing world. Indeed, for many countries, the
stability of macroeconomic balances rest perilously in the capacity of governments to
attract and maintain foreign investment. The consequent sensitivity to international economic forces has thus profoundly altered the politics of domestic social and economic
reforms. The effect of this pressure has been to bring increasingly broad dimensions of
social life under the influence of global economic forces. This is particularly true for the
reform of social security institutions.

*

1.

Doctoral candidate in political science at Duke University. Ms. Brooks specializes in Latin
American political economy with a particular concentration in social policy reform under economic globalization. She is currently writing a dissertation on the reofnr of social security in
Latin America and has carried out research in Brazil, Chileand Peru. Ms. Brooks is also engaged
in research on transformations of religious movements withinthe context of neoliberalism, and
has co-authored a chapter on church politics in Latin America for an edited volume.
This paper was prepared for and presented at the Second Conference on "The Economic and
Political Challenges of Market Reforms in Latin America", Southern Methodist University, Dallas,
Texas, 4 October 1997. I thank Scott Morgenstern, Layne Mosley, Herbert Kitschelt and Peter
Lange for helpful comments on earlier drafts. Research was supported by funds from the Ford
Foundation.
Costs associated with the 'exit' option may include declines in foreign direct investment, forced
devaluations, or higher interest rates charged to government debt.
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Social security reform is unique among the social policy reforms occurring under
structural adjustment Although it has traditionally embodied collective commitments to
poverty alleviation and social rights, in recent years, social security has come under
immense pressure for radical market reform. This has followed from the wide recognition
within investment communities of the potential links between private pension schemes
and capital market development, high domestic savings, and labor market benefits. With
the Chilean system as their model, and compelled by the fervor of international investors
for market-oriented social policy, Latin American governments have led the way in the
movement toward privatization of pension programs. In spite of this pressure and movement toward the market, evidence of institutional reforms in Latin America does not
reveal a convergence on the market-oriented model of social protection. Quite to the contrary, Latin American governments have fashioned rather diverse models of pension provision, suggesting that there is more at play in the process of reform than the weight of international economic constraints. What, then, explains the variations in the degree to which
governments have moved toward marketization of pension provision? This study analyzes

the nine cases of pension reform in Latin America and attempts to explain how domestic
institutions and economic exigencies have combined to generate the variety of national
responses to the task of social security reform in the context of globalizing economies.
Explaining such variance first requires the selection of a relevant dimension along
which to evaluate the products of social security reform. A broad and diverse range of programs is encompassed in social security systems and their meanings differ across countries. Overall, however, the largest and most important component of social security is the
pension system. Institutional reforms of public pension systems are therefore taken to be
emblematic of the broad transformation in social security provision. Within pension
schemes, these changes will be compared across the institutional balance between the public and private structures of the system. That is, the extent to which the structure of the
reformed system privileges market forces over the mutual or solidaristic mechanisms (historically central to public pension schemes) is the dependent variable of this analysis.
The changing balance between market forces and collective mechanisms of social protection has several important consequences for social security. First, it reveals a fundamental transformation in the function of social security in society. Traditional notions of
solidarity, community and egalitarianism, which long governed the structure of social protection, are now being overshadowed by the objectives of capital accumulation and efficiency. The role of the market in this sense is transformed from being the means through
which the goals of social protection were achieved, to becoming now the ends toward
which social security is fashioned.
The state/market split captures the broader tension between the strengthening forces
of individualism and efficiency on the one hand, and the norms of mutuality and community on the other. To the extent that international market forces come to shape an increasingly broader array of social relations, the bonds of solidarity and collectivism are so
diminished. Understanding the changing balance between public and private responsibilities for pension provision thus lays bare the way that globalization has altered the boundary between the public and private spheres of economic life and altered the basic role of
the market in social life.
Beyond the analysis of this general transformation, this study seeks to uncover important information about the factors shaping each state's response to the common challenge
of pension reform. The arguments presented in this study suggest that economic exigen-
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cies play an important role in the degree of marketization of pension reforms. Of particular importance is the reliance upon foreign aid as a source of constraints on policy autonomy. In this variable, the international economic constraints are considered to have roots in
the domestic political and economic arrangements. Pressures arising from a high degree
of aid reliance are held to generate incentives for governments to move toward a greater
reliance on markets for social protection.
The impact of economic pressures is expected to be tempered, however, by domestic
political and socioeconomic institutions. Insofar as political power is diffused within representative democratic institutions, the push toward radical market reform is made more
difficult. Politics matter as well in relation to the partisanship of government. To the
extent that legislative bodies are dominated by parties of the left, one might expect a
greater degree of solidaristic structures to be maintained in the process of pension reform.
Finally, the structure of pre-existing social protection schemes is expected to influence the
degree and nature of pension reform. The stronger and more encompassing the previous
social security institutions are, the less the reform is anticipated to shift pension provision
toward the market.
This analysis treats the nine cases of pension reform in Latin America, as of July 1997.
These are listed below in Table 1. Due to the limitations in the number of reformed pension schemes (N=9), the quantitative analysis in this study is intended principally as a
heuristic device. Its purpose is to indicate what might be systematic relationships among
social, political and economic factors and the varieties of pension schemes in Latin
America. Although the impacts of the variables considered here are anticipated to be conditioned on the values of other variables, the size of the data set prohibits adequate statistical testing of conditional models. Nevertheless, basic multivariate regressions do lend support to hypotheses regarding systematic patterns of variation between the domestic economic and political factors and the nature of institutional reform of public pension
schemesl
The paper takes the following structure. Section II describes the background and context of social security reform in Latin America. Section III introduces the dependent variable of the analysis, the pension index. In Section IV, four key independent variables and
hypotheses are discussed and associated to the pension reform. Section V presents and
discusses the results of the data analysis, and Section VI presents a tentative conclusion.
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II. Social Reform in Latin America: Background and Context.
A.

CRISIS AMIDST CRISIS.

Governments throughout the world, from the Ukraine to the United States, are facing
the difficult dilemma of reforming public social security systems. Although the fiscal and
structural inadequacies of domestic welfare institutions are clearly not unique to Latin
America, the gravity of the social security problem in this region exceeds that faced by
most industrialized countries. What has variously been termed the crisis of social security
in Latin America, must be understood partly as an after-shock of the intense economic crisis of the 1980s (Mesa-Lago 1994, 1996,1997a). 2 The economic collapse of the 1980s witnessed an aggregate reduction in wealth in Latin America, with growth in per capita GDP
for the region falling by 1.8 percent between 1982 and 1986. 3 By the end of the lost
decade, social security systems had suffered steep declines in revenue, deterioration of
4
financial equilibrium, and vast reductions in the coverage and value of benefits.
Hyperinflation undercut the value of social security revenues and contributions at the
same time as real wages were badly eroded. Moreover, in several countries, the governments failed to contribute their statutorily required portion of the pension financing. The
heavily bureaucratized and poorly managed funds were likewise strained by the pressure
for exceptional benefits from privileged groups in society.5 As a consequence, by the close
of the 1980s social security systems throughout Latin America were at varying rates heading toward bankruptcy.
At the same time, the aftermath of economic crisis heightened the need for strong and
effective social safety nets. Austere structural adjustments generated heavy social costs in
the form of reductions in real minimum wages, declining purchasing power, and a steep
rise in unemployment. The scaling back of social services placed the burden of structural
reforms most heavily on the working class and the poor, particularly women and the elderly.6 The broad segments of society left unemployed or forced into the informal sector
added to the strains on already-ailing public assistance institutions. Not only did the pension systems face an increase in the number of citizens dependent upon social services, but
high unemployment and informalization also meant a significant reduction in the contributions to the system. Social security reform thus became an unavoidable priority on the
restructuring agenda for many Latin American governments.

2.

CARMELO MESA-LAGO, CHANGING SOCIAL SECURITY IN LATIN AMERICA: TOWARD ALLEVIATING THE
SOCIAL COSTS OF ECONOMIC REFORM (1994) [hereinafter CHANGING SOCIAL SECURITY]; Carmelo

Mesa-Lago, Social Welfare Reform in the Context of Economic-PoliticalLiberalization: Latin
American Cases, 25 WORLD DEv. 497 (1997) [hereinafter Social Welfare Reform].

3.
4.
5.

Per capita GDP is taken as a percentage of constant prices, averaged for Latin America and the
Carribean. SEBASTIAN EDWARDS, CRISIS AND REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA 7 Table 1 (1995).
MESA-LAGO, CHANGING SOCIAL-SEcuRiTY, supra note 2; Estelle James, Averting the Old-Age Crisis,
FIN. & DEv., June 1995, at 4; Mesa-Lago, Social Welfare Reform, supra note 2, at 497-515; Andras
Botka Uthoff, Pension System Reform in Latin America, CEPAL REV., Aug. 1995.

Mesa-Lago, CHANGING SOCIAL SECURITY, supra note 2; Gesti6n, El Sistema de Pensiones Privadas,
PERIODICo ECONOMICO, Aug. 1992; Mesa-Lago, Social Welfare Reform, supra note 2.
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THE 'MARKET MODEL'.

The 1990s have witnessed explosive growth of movements in financial capital across
borders. The increasing sophistication of market technology and financial products, coupled with efforts by governments to ease restrictions on investment and capital accounts,
have closely integrated financial markets around the world. The effect of global financial
integration on domestic policy-making has been the subject of much current research in
comparative political economy. Many scholars agree that financial integration has placed
important constraints on macroeconomic policy. Nevertheless, the breadth of policy tools
harnessed by international market pressure and the mechanisms through which these constraints are exerted remains unclear. 7 Various scholars have argued that globalization has
raised the cost of expansionary fiscal policies, including the provision of public services
through redistributive taxation. 8 Evidence exists, however, to suggest that the homogenization of domestic institutions is not at hand. 9 What is dear, however, is that the openness of communication, trade and financial transactions in the 1990s has created unparalleled opportunities for the spread of neoliberal ideas. This, added to the rebuke of statist
development that followed the debt crisis, fueled the adoption of a market-oriented model
of pension reform throughout Latin America. 10

6.

7.

8.
9.

10.

COPING WITH AUsTERTY: POVERTY AND INEQUALITY IN LATIN AMERICA (Nora Lustig ed., 1995); Josef
Thesing, Seguridadsocial y estabilidaddemocratica, in SEGURIDAD SOCIAL EN LA ECONOMICA
SOCIAL DEL MERCADO (1995); Mesa-Lago, Social Welfare Reform, supranote 2, at 297-515.
RICHARD N. COOPER, THE ECONOMICS OF INTERDEPENDENCE (1968); Beth A. Simmons, The
Internationalizationof Capital, in CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN CONTEMPORARY CAPITALISM
(Herbert Kitschelt et al. eds., forthcoming); David Andrews, Capital Mobility and State
Autonomy: Toward a StructuralTheory ofInternationalMonetary Relations,38 INT'L. STUD. Q. 193
(1994).
Duane Swank, Politicsand the StructuralDependence of the State in DemocraticCapitalistNations,
86 AMER. POL. SCI. REv. 38 (1992).
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN CONTEMPORARY CAPITALISM (Kitschelt et al. eds., forthcoming);
Geoffrey Garrett & Peter Lange, Internationalization,Institutions and Political Change, in
INTERNATIONALIZATION AND DOMESTIC POLITICS (Milner & Keohane eds., 1995) [hereinafter
Garrett & Lange, Internationalization];Georffrey Garrett & Peter Lange, Political Responses to
Interdependence: What's Left for the Left INT'L ORG., Autumn 1991, at 4,45 [hereinafter Garrett &
Lange, Political].
Explicit endorsement of market-based economics by the influential United Nations Economic
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL), which had long supported the
inward-oriented development, made many countries more receptive to market-oriented reforms.
Edwards, supra note 3. Moreover, the spread of market-based pension models was catalyzed by
the Inter-American Development Bank and World Bank , which offered financial and technical
support for the replacement of public pension schemes with the market model. In a marked
departure from its endorsement, however, on April 25, 1996, CEPAL issued a statement warning
of certain inadequacies of the market pension models, including the tendency toward 'oligopoly'
on the part of the AFPs. Also, CEPAL argued that private systems are inadequate to cover the
poor working class and indigent.
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The institutional design referred to as the market model is most often defined through
reference to the Chilean model of pension reform adopted under the military regime of
Agosto Pinochet in 1981. This scheme signals a direct embrace of free-market economics
and the abandonment of redistributive functions of social security. Assigning a subsidiary
role to the state, the Chilean scheme entrusts the operation of the system to private competing corporations called Administradorasde Fondos de Pensiones (AFPs). These are regulated, supervised and guaranteed by a state agency, and all new entrants into the labor
market are required to join the private system. The Chilean system is fully funded and
based on individual capitalization. That is, individuals contribute a fixed amount from
each paycheck directly to their own private account. The annuity pension that the individual receives upon retirement is calculated solely on the basis of accumulated contributions
and the performance of the investment fund. No additional contribution from the
employer, state or other citizens is added to the individual account.11
This system contrasts starkly with the traditional pay-as-you-go public pension
schemes, in which benefits are defined and contributions are considered to purchase an
entitlement to benefits in old age. 12 The cost of providing the benefits rests on society in
the pay-as-you-go system, whereas it is allocated to the individual in the fully-funded
scheme. There are merits and pitfalls to both systems, and each may be understood to privilege a distinct coalition of interests. For the private system, the benefits are reaped principally by individuals able to save at a level commensurate with the accumulation of sufficient
resources for well-being in old age. Those sectors linked to the domestic financial markets,
such as the investment community, derive great benefits from the private system. Although
it was widely suggested that private pension schemes create overall benefits of increased
13
domestic savings and growth, these claims have recently come under question.
Under pay-as-you-go redistributive systems, in contrast, the goals of universalism, social
solidarity and poverty alleviation appeal mainly to blue collar workers and the poor, whose
income is often insufficient to permit adequate savings for old age. Whereas the private pension system casts off the function of redistribution, the public systems are (at least in theory)
designed around the basic goal of poverty alleviation and redistribution of wealth. 14 For

11. The exception to this is in the instance that an individual contributes to her private fund for a
minimum of twenty years and does not accumulate sufficient funds to permit a minimum pension annuity. In this instance, the Chilean state subsidizes the difference between individual savings and the minimum pension level.
12. Pay-as-you-go indicates that contributions of current active members are immediately directed
to the payment of the current pensions of the retired.
13. Patricio Arrau & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel, Pension Systems and Reforms: Country Experiences and
Research Issues, 9 REVISTA DE ANALISIS ECONoMico 3-20 (1993); ALAN J. AUERBACH & LAURENCE J.
KOTLIKOFF, DYNAmic FISCAL POLICY (1987).

14. It must be noted that pay-as-you-go institutions are solidaristic in their formal orientation, but
unfortunately do not always distribute income in the proper direction. Many existing systems
have been subject to political interference by privileged groups, which have demanded and
received benefits far in excess of any actuarially sustainable level. These have meant a redistribution of income from the working class to the less-needy and politically privileged sectors.
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those who are poor during their working lives, private pension systems offer no means of alleviating poverty in old age. 15 The endogeneity of redistributive mechanisms is thus a key variable distinguishing pay-as-you-go institutions from private pension schemes.
Prominent research on social security reform in advanced industrialized countries has
treated the movement toward privatization as a general retrenchment of welfare systems.16
This view, however, is too narrow to permit full comprehension of the nature of neoliberal
pension reform and the forces driving it. Private systems of social protection have always
existed alongside the public systems. 17 The contemporary movement in pension reforms
thus represents a basic shift in the weight of responsibilities for social protection from the
collective public schemes toward private market-oriented mechanisms. It is in this sense
as much an amplification of one component of pension provision as it is a retrenchment
of another. Considering this dualism, rather than simply the cutbacks in the reforms, is
important for understanding the range of new issues and interests forged over the question of privatization of pension provision.
III. The Pension Index.
In order to capture the structure of shared responsibilities between private and public
institutions, it is necessary to look beyond the aggregate spending levels to isolate those
structures that delineate the formal role of the state in pension provision. Public responsibilities in the pension scheme are taken to be those directly legislated and administered by
the state, or those privately managed schemes with clear and explicit government mandate
to provide a certain type of pension. 18 Operationalizing social security for the purpose of
cross-national comparison is, however, rife with difficulties. Principally, it is a concept
with broad meaning, encompassing the whole range of programs and objectives of protecting individuals from loss of income and well being in the market economy. 19 Crossnational comparisons are confounded as well by the dilemma of establishing general taxonomies among programs interwoven with distinct social, economic and cultural attributes. This complexity has often muddled this task to the point where multi-country comparisons become little more than illustrative sketches. To avoid this dilemma, I adopt the
15. Nguyen X.Nguyen, Social Security Issues and Elements of Reforn, WORLD

BANK WORKING PAPER

SERIES, May, 1994.
16.

PAUL PIERSON, DISMANTLING THE WELFARE STATE?: REAGAN, THATCHER AND THE POLITICS OF

RETRENCHMENT (1994); Paul Pierson, The New Politics of the Welfare State,WORLD POL., Jan. 1996,

at 48.
17. The complementary existence of market-based and collective mechanisms within systems of
social protection underpins as well the "multi-pillared" approach advocated by the World Bank.
In its influential 1994 report, the World Bank proposed a three-pillared system which would
include a universal public pillar to function as a redistributive safety net along with a private pillar serving as an instrument of economic growth through forced savings. The third pillar is a voluntary savings annuity plan that would exist as an option for those desiring more security than
that provided by the two main pillars. WORLD BANK, AVERTING THE OLD AGE CRISIS (1994). For

further discussion of these pillars, see James, supra note 4.
18.

GOSTA ESPING-ANDERSON, THE THREE WORLDSOF WELFARE CAPITALISM 81 (1990).

19. Theresa Durnbeck, Sistemas de Seguridaden America Latina: Sintesis de Estudios Nacionales,in LA
SEGURIDAD SOCIAL EN AMERICA LATINA: SEIs EXPERIENCIAS DIFERENTES (1997).
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Titmuss approach to comparing welfare institutions across borders. 20 This method lays

bare the basic structural contents of national pension programs as they define the public
role in the allocation of social protection.
The definition of social security employed in any study naturally reflects the theoretical concern of that analysis. In the European welfare state literature, the public goal of
social protection is the decommodification, or emancipation of the individual from utter
dependence on the market for her well-being. 2 1 In Latin America, social protection has
been pursued in a less ambitious fashion, but has nevertheless embodied collective efforts
to alleviate the risks of loss of income in the market economy. Public discourse on social
security in Latin America focuses mainly on pensions as a social right. The state's role in
buffering the individual from the vicissitudes of the market has in this context been taken
as a symbol of public commitment to social solidarity. For that reason, solidarity is
employed here to designate the public, redistributive mechanism of pension provision.
Contrasted with this mechanism are the market forces. These shape the allocation of pension protection according to the demands of efficiency and individualism. The solidaristic
and market-based mechanisms are thus assigned as the endpoints on the array of possible
outcomes of institutional reform.
The index presented below is meant to provide a simple analytical framework in
which to compare the degree of solidarity or marketization of pension schemes. The index
is a compilation of five basic facets of pension systems. The allocation of pension responsibilities between the market and state is measured in these five components and coded so as
to reveal the relative dominance of public or private forces in the overall pension scheme.
A higher score on the pension index indicates greater solidarity and a more prominent role
for collective public institutions in the pension scheme, while a lower score suggests that
market forces are privileged in the structure of pension provision.

20. RicHAiP-D Tirmuss, EssAYs ON THE WELFARE STATE (1958). This method has since been employed by
other researchers such as John Myles in 1985, Walter Kopri and Gosta Esping-Andersen in 1984
and 1986, and by Esping-Andersen in 1985 and in 1987.
21. It should be noted that the original purposes of public social security schemes were much more
conservative. Bismarck began to provide welfare and pensions with the objective of heading off
Socialist movements and controlling workers. He is said to have proclaimed, "One who can look
forward to an old age pension is far more content and much easier to manage" Anthony King,
The PoliticalConsequences of the Welfare State, in EVALUATING THE WELFARE STATE: SOCIAL AND
POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES (Shimon E.Spiro & Ephraim Yuchtman-Yaar eds., 1983).
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Table 2.
22

Pension Index
1. Burden shared with the employee.

2. Institutionalization of the state role.

3. Mandatory enrollment in private pillar.

4. Indexation of minimum pension

5.Social assistance pension.

* The

This measures the portion of pension finances that are
statutorily assigned to the employer and the state
through payroll contributions. It is meant capture the
portion of the responsibility for the individual's pension which is shared through collective financing
mechanisms. A higher score indicates a lower individual burden.
This is scored as 0 if there is no endogenous, fixed
responsibility of the state in the pension finance; 5 if
the state role is formal but residual (the state only subsidizes deficits); and 10 if the state commitment to
pension finance is fixed as a percent of payroll contribution.
This dichotomous factor reveals whether workers may
choose to enroll in the public or private system. It is
scored as 0 if private system is mandatory for all new
entrants into the workforce, and 10 if new entrants are
not mandated to the fully private piUar.
Scored 0 if there is no adjustment of the minimum
pension for inflation, and 10 if it is indexed either by
the government or automatically according to the CPI.
Scored 0 if the government offers no universal social
assistance pension, and 10 if the state does sponsor this
basic pension.

sum of these five components is the score on the pension index.

Component 1 is intended to measure the degree of individualism versus solidarism in
the structure of pension finance. To the extent that the scheme mandates a fixed payroll
contribution from the employer and state, the individual burden is lower, and the system
score indicates a stronger component of solidarism. Component 2 roughly captures the
residualism of the state role. Where the function of the state in social protection is secondary to market forces, the state's role is residual. This is represented in the index where
the state has no fixed obligation or is responsible only for financing deficits (i.e., stepping
in only where the private mechanisms fail).
Components 3 and 4 measure the extent to which market forces are bounded in the
provision of pensions. A score of ten on Component 3 suggests a recognition by the state
that the market system is not the optimal mechanism of protection for every citizen, and a
retention of the state role in that provision. Component 4 reveals the commitment of col22. The score on this component runs naturally between 0-100, but is rescaled to a 0-10 interval consistent with the other four components.
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lective resources and public responsibility for the protection of old age income from the
loss of value on the market. Component 5 reveals the presence of a safety net that separates an individual's old age income from her savings during working life to some degree.
To the extent that well-being in old age is closely and positively linked to saved income, the
system is more individual and marketized. The score of ten on this component is thus a
simple indication23of the effort to de-link well-being in old age from income during one's
working lifetime.
Although three of the five components of this index are dichotomous, the marked
variation in scores suggests important differences in the ways that governments balance
the contending objectives of market development and redistribution. The factors at play
within each country that generate these unique models of social protection will be
explored below in the analysis of domestic institutions and economic forces.

IV. Independent Variables.
This section presents several arguments from the political economy literature that
suggest plausible links among certain economic, political and social variables and the
nature of pension reforms. Four hypotheses are proposed based on these arguments, and
subsequently tested in simple multivariate analysis. The relationships identified in the
regression analysis are treated simply as indicators of systematic patterns of variation
among the variables discussed. These will serve to indicate fruitful avenues of future
research into the rich conjuncture of factors operating in each country.
A.

POLITICAL VARIABLES.

1.

Power Resource Theories.

Social security institutions are political creations. As such, it is fitting that we examine
configurations of political institutions and partisan forces to understand the source of differentiation in the reform of public pension schemes. Political explanations for the formation of welfare states in Europe have often fallen upon power-centered theories. Powercentered theories propose that government is neither a neutral arbiter of social interests,
nor responsive to manifest social needs. Instead, government actions are dictated by the
exercise of power by social interests, making the balance of political forces crucial in determining which configuration of interests will dominate. 24 Class-based power struggles
have been the traditional framework within which to understand the politics of welfare
state. 25 Strong unions and left parties are considered to provide workers with critical
resources for securing state protection. Although power resource theories have been fruitful in accounting for cross-national differences in welfare state expansion, they have
26
proved less able to predict the nature and outcome of social security reform.
23. This variable is also a proxy for the replacement rate of defined benefit schemes. This data is typically unreliable in Latin America and moreover is calculated on generally incomparable bases.
For those reasons, a more precise measure of replacement rates is excluded from the index.
24.

ESPING-ANDERSEN, THE THREE WORLDS OF WELFARE CAPITALISM, supra note

25.

WALTER KORPI, THE D.mociRATnc CLASS STRUGGLE (1983).

26. Pierson, The New Politics of the Welfare State, supra note 16.

18, at 105.
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A variant of the power-centered theory that has become particularly relevant in the
context of globalization centers upon what is termed the 'structural power of capital'
Derived from Marxist dass-based analysis, this theory holds that positive economic performance and growth require the willingness of capital owners to engage in productive
investments. Popular approval of government and the extraction of resources to keep it
running are in turn contingent on positive performance of the domestic economy. As a
consequence, the theory holds, politicians wishing to maximize the perquisites of office
must provide incentives for investment and avoid redistributive policies that would be
27
unwelcome by owners of capital.
This perspective has regained currency in the recent literature on economic globalization.28 As new advances in technology, communication and financial instruments increase
the facility of capital movement across borders, owners of mobile assets acquire an
enhanced exit option in the face of unfavorable economic policies. Scholars have thus
identified this as an increasingly constraining, if not determining factor in the nature of
domestic institutional design. 29 Swank, for instance, found that although overall taxes on
business have remained steady, payroll taxes on business for social security in the OECD
have dropped by one-third in response to greater capital mobility. The pressures for market-friendly taxation policies, he concedes, have limited the consciously redistributive policies. 30 This view has become fuel for the convergence literature, which ascribes a key role
to the interests of mobile capital owners in the reform of domestic institutions. Recent
political economy research, however, has seriously questioned this fait accompli view of
31
domestic institutional convergence.
Power resource theories are in essence pluralist formulations. That is, they ascribe
direct links between the distributions of social power and resulting public policy and insti-

27. Block reminds us, however, that the punishing or 'veto' power of capitalists (to withhold investment) is not exerted through a concerted class effort. Rather, capitalists consider government
policy as individuals and assess policy choices in terms of how they affect their own profit-driven
interests. Fred Block, The Ruling Class Does Not Rule: Notes on the Marxist Theory of the State, 7
SOCIALIST REVOLUTION 6 (1977). Overall, however, this power theory suggests a prominent role for
owners of capital in determining the nature of economic policy. Id.; see also, Stephen L. Elkin,
Pluralismin its Place: State and Regime in Liberal Democracy, in THE DEMOCRATIc STATE 179
(Roger Benjamin & Stephen L.Elkin eds., 1985); Adam Przeworski & Michaeil Wallerstein,
StructuralDependence of the State on Capital, 82 Am. POL. Sci. REV. 11 (1988); Duane Swank,
Politics and the Structural Dependence of the State in Democratic CapitalistNations, 86 Am. POL..
Sci. REv. 38 (1992); Swank, Fundingthe Welfare State, supra note 8.
28. See Garrett & Lange, Internationalization,supra note 9; Swank, Funding the Welfare State supra
note 8.
29. See Andrews, supra note 7; COOPER, supra note 7; JEFFRY A. FRIEDEN, DEBT, DEVELOPMENT, AND
DEMocRAcY (1991); PAULETTE KURZER, BUSINESS & BANKING (1991).

30. Swank, Fundingthe Welfare State, supranote 8, at 11.
31. Garrett & Lange, Internationalization,supra note 9; Garrett & Lange, Political, supra note 9;
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN CONTEMPORARY CAPITALISM

(Herbert Kitschelt et al eds., forthcom-

ing); Andrew Sobel, Domestic Policy Choices, Political Institutional Change, and Financial
Globalization (paper presented at conference in Duke University, May 1997).
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tutions. While important research that has been produced in this vein 32 are key examples
of these, the power theories are fundamentally flawed at their premise. They overlook the
important role of institutions that intervene between raw social preferences and political
outputs. In this analysis, pressures from economic interests and global economic forces are
assumed to be filtered in the domestic arena by the configuration of domestic political and
socioeconomic institutions unique to each polity.
2.

FormalPoliticalInstitutions.

The institutional milieu in which social, economic and political relations are embedded provides important explanatory leverage in this analysis. Institutions are widely recognized to intervene between the raw preferences of society and government behavior,
shaping not only how interests are translated into policy, but the very nature of those
interests as well. Institutions are examined here on two levels: (1) socioeconomic structures, such as previous social protection schemes; and, (2) formal political institutions,
such as the legislative power of the executive, which aggregate and translate interests into
government action. 33 The nature of political responses to the pressures for social reform
amidst globalizing markets is assumed here to vary with the diversity of political institutions through which these pressures are filtered.
B.

POLITICAL PROCESS: THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWER.

The first political variable considered here relates to the process through which
reforms are crafted, and in particular, in whose hands the decision rests. Formal political
institutions structure collective decision processes in a polity. By providing procedural
advantages and impediments to different groups in the legislative process, political structures pattern the degree of influence which any set of actors can exert over policy outcomes. 34 In this view, the rules of representation (i.e., who participates in the decisionmaking process and how) are central to understanding whose voice is heard in the political
process. 35 These rules are considered to be embodied in the way that power is allocated
between the executive and legislature in the lawmaking process.
The structure of decision-making power and political reforms has been the subject of
important research in political science. In particular, scholars have suggested that the
greater the fragmentation of political power, the more able entrenched interests are to
block reforms. 36 This notion of veto points has been used to differentiate the capacity of
political leaders to carry out moderate versus radical retrenchment of the welfare state. 37
32. See RONALD

ROGOWSKI, COMMERCE AND COALITIONS: How TRADE AFFECTS DOMESTIC POLITICAL

ALIGNMENTS (1989); FRIEDEN, supranote 29.
33. Cf Garrett & Lange, Internationalization,supra note 9.
34. See PETER A. HALL, GOVERNING THE ECONOMY.THE POLITICS OF STATE INTERVENTION INBRITAIN AND
FRANCE (1986); Ellen M. Immergut, The Rules of the Game: The Logic of Health Policy-Making in
France, Switzerland, and Sweden, in STRUCTURING POLITICS: HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM IN
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 57 (Sven Steinmo et al eds., 1992).

35. Cf.Hall, supranote 34.
36. See Immergut, supra note 34; Evelyne Huber et al., Social Democracy, Christian Democracy,
ConstitutionalStructure, and the Welfare State, 99 AM. J. OF Soc. 711 (1993); Pierson, The New
Politics of the Welfare State, supra note 16.
37. Pierson, The New Politicsofthe Welfare States, supranote 16.
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Whereas Pierson argues that the concentration of power permits leaders greater leverage
within which to maneuver for radical reforms, the arduous political negotiations undertaken in the European and U.S. legislatures have permitted only moderate trims in social
security programs. 38 The veto points literature thus begins with the assumption that the
entrenched interests will favor preservation of the current pension system. Based on this,
it suggests that the greater the concentration of power to legislate, the stronger the capacity
to bypass these interests and move toward marketized pension systems.
The strong and insulated executive power in the realm of legislation would in scheme
create an electoral slack, or room for more autonomous executive action. 39 Strong executive powers may serve either as a critical balance to check legislative excesses and expedite
reforms, or it may enable the president to bypass elected representatives and unilaterally
implement reforms by decree. According to the expectations of the veto points theory,
strong executive powers would serve toward the latter. Consider, for example, the cases of
Peru in 1992 and Chile in 1981 where democracy was suspended during the process of
reform. In these cases, a strongly marketized reform of the pension system was adopted by
decree. The distribution of power in the crafting of reforms is approached in this analysis
through a measure of presidential powers. Following the veto point literature, the fewer
hands in which the decision rests, the more radical the nature of the structural transformation in pension programs is expected to be.
Alternatively, the allocation of decision-making power to a democratically elected legislature is thought to generate certain obstacles to the extensiveness of reform. This may be
attributed not simply to the number of interests involved, but to the mechanisms of
responsiveness and popular approval basic to democracy. In this view, governments will
alter their role in the economy to the benefit of one sector only to the point that the welfare loss to the rest of society causes them to respond negatively and hold the government
responsible. 40 Whereas power resource theories predict that governments will make concessions to owners of capital in order to attract foreign currency and investment, the institutional view suggests that capitalist interests might be checked in democracy by the political demands of the majority. This majority, maintains, will favor redistribution to compensate for market risks and losses. 41 The punishing mechanism of democratic institutions, in addition to the diffusion of power in legislative bodies, thus creates incentives for
42
governments to broaden the membership of beneficiaries of their economic policies.
Hypothesis I. The greater the degree of power to legislate is placed in the hands of the
executive for the pension reforms, the more likely the result is to shift toward marketization in
the structureof the pension scheme.

38. Id.
39. Id.
40. William C. Mitchell & Michael C. Munger, Economic Models of Interest Groups:An Introductory
Survey, 35 Am. J.or POL. Sci. 512 (1991).
41. ESPING-ANDERSEN, THE THREE WORLDS OF WELFARE CAPITALISM, supranote 18, at 15.
42. Cf Elkin, supranote 27.
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1. Partisanship.
The second political variable tested in this analysis considers who is occupying the

positions of power. This suggests that the partisan makeup of the government affects the
way policy-makers weigh the respective costs and benefits of different institutional forms
and mediate among the contending socioeconomic interests. That governments desire to
stay in office is a general rule of political science. The main tools at their disposal to do this
include increasing the general welfare of the society, or issuing distributional benefits to
their bases of support.43 Given that the benefits of the former strategy take effect only in
the long term, the latter is preferred as a means to stay in power in the face of short-run
electoral demands.44 Understanding the different pension models as opportunities to
issue distributional benefits to distinct coalitions renders the hypothesis that partisanship
matters for the direction of pension reform more plausible.
Some authors challenge the notion that partisanship matters in the context of globalization. For instance, Paulette Kurzer suggests that in the context of high capital mobility, leftoriented political parties "follow the cues and programs of right-wing or conservative parties
and have no alternatives to proposals to shrink the public sector, privatize social services, and
deregulate labor markets' 45 Kurzer's hypothesis has been effectively disputed, however, by
research showing that under certain conditions left parties may still pursue programmatic
objectives through supply side programs. 46 While the globalization of the economy has
undoubtedly raised the costs of certain fiscal and monetary policy options, the conclusion
that there is no room for pursuit of programmatic policy objectives may be premature. For
instance, has found a positive correlation between the strength of welfare benefits and leftlabor power in the OECD. 47 These strands of research suggest the plausibility of hypotheses
of a continuing role for government partisanship in explaining the balance between state and

market in the pension reforms. Although global market forces encourage a stronger shift
toward private pension funds, the extent to which the market dominates the system is
expected to be mediated by the ideological stripe of the government.
Hypothesis II. Where governments are dominated by parties of the left, they will be
more likely to maintainstrongpubli4 or 'solidaristic'structuresin the pension scheme.

43.

Garrett & Lange, Internationalization,supra note 9.

44. See id. at 544-45.
45.
46.

KURZER, supra note 29, at 3.
See Garrett & Lange, Internationalization,supra note 9, at 541, 545. In strong, corporatist

economies, they find, parties of the left are able to pursue redistribution, active labor market programs, and to alter investment incentives. Where labor is weak and not centrally organized, in
contrast, market-oriented supply side policies are more prevalent. Unfortunately, the scarcity of
cross-national data on labor organization in Latin America prohibits the testing of these condi47.

tional effects of partisanship and labor structure on the nature of institutional choices. See id. at
544-45.
See Garrett, supranote 28.
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ECONOMIC VARIABLES.

The intensity of global economic pressures exerted upon policy-making is widely considered to be an exogenous, structural component of domestic political analyses. In this
study, the endogenous nature of this constraint is examined. In particular, the degree of
reliance on foreign economic aid is considered to generate varying degrees of international
constraint on domestic policy.
1. Reliance on ForeignAid.
Foreign economic assistance is rarely granted in the absence of some conditions for
policy change in the receiving country. The wave of structural reforms in Latin America
following the debt crisis bears witness to this claim. In exchange for loans from multilateral institutions to service external debt and stabilize fiscal accounts, national governments
agreed to implement a series of tough market-oriented reforms aimed at removing the
structural distortions in domestic economies. Although the reliance on foreign economic
aid has been decreasing in recent decades in Latin America, the quid pro quo exchange of
policy autonomy for economic assistance is still relevant. 48 The recent peso crisis in
Mexico reveals the continuing link between foreign aid and the limits of domestic policy
autonomy. As observed in Mexico, "given the need to rely on external savings to restore
and sustain growth, to have access to public credit the government had to introduce market-oriented reforms to please multilateral institutions and the US government." 49 The
more a country relies on foreign aid, the more we may expect it to move toward marketization in the social security reform.
Hypothesis III. The greater the presence of foreign aid in the domestic economy, the
strongerthe degree of marketization in the structureof reformedpension institutions.
D.

SOCIOECONOMIC STRUCTURES.

1. PreviousSocial Security Institutions.
The main thrust of this analysis emphasizes the political and economic factors shaping the choice of institutional reforms. The choice of institutions, however, must not be
considered to occur in the context of a blank slate. Once established, social security institu50
tions become "a powerful societal mechanism which decisively shapes the future."
Indeed, pre-existing institutions serve as one of the most important factors shaping the
direction and nature of institutional reforms to social security. The social protection structures existing prior to the reform exert their influence on the reform process first by delimiting the realm of conceivable reform models. The issues that have traditionally defined
social security fashion in turn the terms of debate on reform. 5 1 The importance of path*dependence in the reform of social security is thus an important factor shaping social

48. See Joel Bergman & Xiaofang Shen, Foreign Direct Investment in Devleoping Countries:
ProgressandProblems,32 FIN. & DEv. (1995).
49. COPING WITH AUSTERITY: POVERTY AND INEQUALITYIN LATIN AMERICA, supra note 6, at 32.
50.

ESPING-ANDERSEN, supra note 18, at 221.

51.

Id. at 108-111.
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security reform. Depending on the nature of previous structures, deep reform of social
security may be facilitated or nearly impossible.
Pre-existing pension schemes give different groups something to fight for insofar as
they define the limits of social rights and benefits. Once acquired, citizens are ill-disposed
to surrender what they consider to be their rights and entitlements. For beneficiaries of the
public social security institutions, market-oriented reforms present tangible and immediate losses, with only distant and diffuse benefits. As prospect theory suggests, people are
more averse to losses than they are receptive to potential gains (Kahneman & Tversky,
1979). Consequently, to the extent that social security systems provided strong benefits to
broad segments of the population, a wide coalition of interests may be expected to oppose
the reforms and thus limit the degree of marketization in the final scheme.
Hypothesis IV. Where existing pension schemes are stronger and more universal, the
reformed institution is more likely to retain a solidaristicmechanism for allocation ofpension
benefts.
In any analysis of social security reform, the impact of existing social security schemes
should not be underestimated. There are a variety of other structural dimensions of the
existing social security institutions which may be expected to influence the nature of
reforms. In particular, the structure of benefit provisions is likely to shape the coalitions of
interests that form around the question of pension reform. The benefit structures shape
the possibilities for collective action by delineating distinct social identities and status
communities. 52 Insofar as pension schemes are highly segmented across industries, it is
likely that collective action in defense of public benefits would be more difficult. Data on
this and other useful dimensions of existing social security programs is, however, often
unreliable and difficult to compare in variables-based analysis. Moreover, given the richness of meaning embedded in each national system, it may be more appropriate to consider the impact of existing social security systems through case-study research.
V. Data Analysis and Discussion.
The previous section of this paper advanced four hypotheses relating to certain political, economic and institutional factors, which in their varying national configurations,
combine to produce the unique form of social protection found in each country. In this
section, these variables are operationalized and tested through simple OLS regressions. The
size of the data set (N=9) urges caution in investing great confidence in the explanatory
power of the statistical results. Nevertheless, the results below may serve as a starting point
for research and discussions on the mechanism driving variations in capitalist forms that
are unfolding throughout Latin America and the developing world.

52.

Id.atIO8-111.
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A.

POLITICAL PROCESS: THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWER.
Hypothesis I. The greater the degree of legislativepower placed in the hands of the executive for the formulation of pension reforms, the more extensive the shift toward marketization in the structureof the pension scheme
Absent any comparable measure of veto points in legislative processes, the diffusion of
power in the reform process is measured through an index of legislative power of presidencies created by.53 This records the legislative powers of presidents relating to veto
power, decrees, budgetary power, exclusive introduction of legislatures and proposals of
referenda. 54 The scores show marked variations in the degree of legislative power given to
55
presidents in the countries considered here.
The presidential power variable was not significant alone in bivariate regression against
the dependent variable, the pension index. However, the variable recorded consistently
strong and significant effects in the multivariate models, inclining always in the direction of
marketization for every unit increase in executive powers. The results of the bivariate and
one multivariate regression are listed below.56 In addition, the relation of presidential powers to pension index scores is illustrated below in a scatterplot that reveals a slight negative
inclination in the range of variables, consistent with the slope of the fitted line.

53. See MATrHEw SOBERG SHUGART & JOHN M. CAREY, PRESIDENTS AND ASSEMBLIES: CONSTITUTIONAL
DESIGN AND ELECTORAL DYNAmICS (1992).
54. See id at 150.
55. For Chile and Peru, the reform fell under a period of authoritarian rule claimed temporarily by
Fujimori in a self-coup of 1992, and in Chile during thirteen years of military rule under General
Agosto Pinochet. Presidential powers in these cases are coded 10, the maximum value on the 010 scale.
56. To conserve space, the result of the full multivariate model is displayed for just one of the independent variables. The results of all regressions are contained in Appendix 4.
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Bivariate model, dependent variable = index score
Number of obs
F( 1, 7)
Prob > F.
R-squared
Adj R-squared
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=
=
=
=
=
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-
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Additive model, controlling for aid as a percent of GDP:
Number of obs
F( 2, 6)
Prob > F
R-squared
Adj R-squared
index

=
=
=
=
=

9
7.22
0.0253
0.7065
0.6087

I
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I -3.39801
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P>It

--

0.015
0.017
0.000

The executive power variable does not exert a strong independent effect on the nature
of the pension reform. In the presence of controls for contextual variables, however, the
effect of presidential powers holds above the 95 percent confidence threshhold. Every unit
increase in presidential powers is associated with a move toward marketization in the pension reform.
The weakness of the bivariate model may not be overwhelmingly important in and of
itself, but it strikes upon a point of sensitivity in the veto points theory. In particular, that
there is little reason to believe that a strong executive would necessarily desire marketization over solidarism in the pension structures. Instead, it is plausible that the effect of
presidential powers on the nature of reform may be conditioned upon the value taken by
other contextual variables, such as partisanship or socioeconomic structures. Although
the multivariate models showed strong correlations between the concentration of legislative power and the marketization of reforms, an alternative hypothesis is suggested as well.
In particular, we may expect presidential powers to acquire meaning for the nature of
reform when understood in the context of variables that would indicate the direction in
which the executive might be disposed to exert his power.
Overall, the concentration of legislative power in the hands of the executive relates to
a stronger degree of marketization in the reformed pension structure. Support is lent to
Hypothesis I, but only insofar as presidential powers are evaluated in the context of con-
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trols for structural variables. When considered independently, however, the concentration
of legislative power can not be confidently related to any particular pension structure. In
the scatterplot below, the strong negative relation between the executive's power to legislate
and the solidaristic component of the pension reform is evident. The mechanism lying
below this relation, however, remains to be tested through conditional models and case
study research.
56.66
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PARTISANSHIP.

Hypothesis II. Where governments are dominated by parties of the left, they will be
more likely to maintain strongpublic, or 'solidaristic'structuresin the pension scheme.
The partisanship of government is operationalized through a measure of left-labor
power in the legislature. This is calculated as the weighted sum of legislative seat shares in
the sitting congress at the time of reform. 57 The partisanship of the executive is not operationalized here on account of the coding dilemma created by the prevalence of populist
58
behavior among executives.

57. See POLITICAL HANDBOOK OF THE WORLD (Arthur S. Banks et al eds., 1995-96) (coding the left
power variables); SouTH AMERICA, CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, 1997 (6th ed. 1996)

(also coding the left power variables).
58. See generally ESPING-ANDERSON, supra note 18; Garrett, supranote 28.
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The regression results below lend support to Hypothesis II, that partisanship matters for
the nature of social security reforms. Specifically, the bivariate regression reveals that the
stronger the legislative presence of left-oriented political parties, the resulting pension reform
will be more inclined toward solidarism. This relationship holds above the 95 percent confidence level for this sample. The effect of partisanship remains strong as well when controlling for structural variables. Below, where the level of foreign aid as a percent of GDP is controlled for, the partisanship variable records an even stronger effect on the score of the pension index. In every multivariate regression run with the partisanship variable, the effect of
left power was the same: a strong and significant effect, inclining the reform in the direction
of greater solidarity. See Appendix 4 for the results of all regression results.
Bivariate OLS regression with partisanship variable
Dependent variable = Index score
Number of obs
F( 1, 7)
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R-squared
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Additive model, controlling for aid as a percent of GDP:
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R-squared
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For those skeptical of the strong statistical results, the scatterplot may provide stronger
evidence of a close, positive relation between the left dominance in a legislature and the
degree of solidarism in the structure of reforms. Still, however, this array reveals simple
correlations, obscuring the complexity of causal factors that generate this outcome. The
capacity to explore the variety of socioeconomic institutions and economic conditions that
interact with partisanship is impossible in this simple analysis. We may anticipate capturing such complexity only through closer analysis of the interaction of factors shaping the
pension reforms.
C.

RELIANCE ON FOREIGN AID.

Hypothesis Il1. The greater the presence of foreign aid in the domestic economy, the
stronger the degree of marketization in the structureof reformedpension institutions.
The dependence on foreign aid is operationalized in this analysis through six distinct
World Bank Economic Development Indicators of aid dependence. These include: (1)
official development assistance and official aid ($ millions) for 1990;59 (2) aid per capita,
in 1990 dollars; (3) aid as a percentage of 1990 GNP; (4) aid as a percentage of 1990 gross
domestic investment (5) aid as a percentage of 1990 imports of goods and services; and,
(6) aid as a percentage of 1990 central government expenditures. For each permutation of
this variable, the result of the linear multivariate regression (controlling for political variables) was the same: strong and statistically significant negative relationship to the score on
59. To avoid temporal inconsistency, each of these variables is recorded for a decade earlier in the
case of Chile.
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the pension index. As the reliance on aid increases, the pension reform is inclined toward
a greater reliance on markets. 60 Illustrated below are the results of the linear models. Since
all six operationalizations yielded the same results, just one is displayed: overseas development assistance. In the results of the partisanship variable (above) are the multivariate
results for the aid as a percent of GDP variable. The results of the other four regression
analyses are contained in Appendix 4.
Additive model, controlling for partisanship:
Number of obs
F( 2, 6)
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Additive model, controlling for presidential power:
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60. Although the data set limits us to simple additive models, certain conditional hypotheses may be
surmised. For instance, we may expect that high levels of aid dependence would condition the
influence of partisanship, making ideological differences less significant in the context of very
high international pressures.
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The regression analyses lend support to to the hypothesis that the reliance on foreign
economic aid generates constraints upon the autonomy of domestic policy-making. When
the degree of dependence on foreign aid in the domestic economy is stronger, the inclination of the model toward marketization is greater. This holds above the 95 percent confidence interval for the dependence on aid when controlling both for the presidential powers as well as for the partisanship of government. The six distinct measures of aid dependence were meant as a test of robustness of this variable. The consistent, statistically significant and positive relationship to the score on the pension index scored for each measure lends confidence to the relationship suggested above. The scatterplot below reveals
the strong positive relationship between the (low) level of overseas development assistance
and the solidarity of reformed pension schemes.
The dilemma that lingers with this variable as well, is the conditional effect. At higher
levels of aid dependence, will partisanship still matter? At (dictatorially) high levels of
executive power, will aid dependence matter? Since partisanship and aid dependence exert
opposing effects, under what conditions will one win out over the other? As more data
become available, the research animated by these questions may reveal important information about the mechanism behind the unique responses to globalization revealed in the
variety of domestic social and economic reforms.
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C.

PRE-EXISTING SOCIAL SECURITY INSTITUTIONS.

Hypothesis IV. Where existing pension schemes are more strong and universal, the
reformed institution is more likely to retain a solidaristicmechanism for the allocation ofpension benefits.
Operationalizing the strength and universality of existing pension schemes requires one
to venture into perilous turfi the data on coverage and expenditures of Latin American social
security schemes in the 1980s. The data employed for this analysis derives principally from
those gathered by6 ' the variable was approached from a variety of perspectives, including
data measuring the total payroll contribution in the old system, the system dependency
(ratio of pensioners to contributors), the ranking of the burden assumed by the social security scheme, 62 the old system replacement rate, social security taxes (as a percent of current
revenue in the 1980s [1970s for Chile]), and the coverage of the system in 1980. These variables were selected as rough measures of the strength and extent of the pre-existing social
security institutions. Among these variables, two recorded significant results: the social security taxes (percent of current revenue, 1980s/70s), and the Mesa Lago burden rank.
The results of the statistical analysis are shown below.63 These lend some support to
Hypothesis IV, although two of the three models hold just below the 90 percent confidence
level. Only the measure of social security taxes as a percent of current revenue in the 1980s
is statistically significant above 95 percent when controlling for presidential powers.
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See generallyMESA-LAGo, supra note 4.
62. Id.
63. These results are not for the full model, but record just the statistics relating to the social security
variables in three distinct models. The first is a bivariate regression of the burden rank against
the dependent variable (the pension index), while the second is a multivariate model with ss8O
controlling for partisanship, and the third is a multivariate model with ss8o, controlling for presidential powers.
61.
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VI. Conclusion.
Social security has been said to embody a "response, by social means, to an aspiration
for security, for confidence that one's quality of life would not be totally eroded by any
social or economic eventuaity.? With the advance of market reforms in Latin America,
the primordial goal of social security, the creation of a buffer against the vicissitudes of the
market, as well as the collective means through which this was achieved, have begun to face
important changes. As market forces acquire greater importance, social prevision comes
to rely less and less on social means of protection as it does on individual methods of prevision. In this paper I have attempted to reveal empirically the varying degrees of this
transformation in the extent to which pension schemes are governed by market-driven or
collective mechanisms. The larger puzzle, however, has been (and still is) to explain the
conditions under which domestic political arrangements win out over market forces in
shaping the pension institutions.
Prominent scholars have spoken of the "retrenchment" of welfare and the "crossroads"
met in the development of social protection institutions. 65 These perspectives suggest on
the one hand that pension reform is solely a destructive process, while on the other that it
represents a dichotomous choice between the state and the market. I have attempted to
present an alternative conceptualization of the current wave of social security reforms.

64. See generally Nguyen, supra note 15.
65. See Pierson, supra note 16; Evelyne Huber, Social Security Reform in Latin America, in WELFARE
STATES IN TRANSITION: NATIONAL ADAPTATIONS IN GLOBAL EcONOMIEs (Gosta Esping-Andersen ed.,
1994).
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This has endeavored to move from the all-or-nothing view of institutional reform toward
an appreciation of the variety of state/market compromises that exist in between the unreformed and fully transformed systems. This array of outcomes has permitted closer examination of the underlying configuration of forces at play in each country. From even the
few cases at hand, it has been possible to draw systematic links between the unique political equilibrium reached in each nation, and the contending array of domestic political,
economic and social forces that filter and mediate between global economic pressures and
domestic political exigencies.
The results of this analysis, however preliminary, suggest the existence of important
sources of divergence in national systems of social protection in a global economy. Even in
the face of strong international economic pressures, politics still matter. The concentration of lawmaking powers and the ideological bias of the government help to predict
which interests will be privileged in the reform process, and hence the likelihood of a shift
toward marketization of pensions. Path dependence also provides a key to understanding
the nature of social security reforms. Traditionally strong and universal systems of social
protection generate broad coalitions of 'stakeholders' defending their public benefits as a
social right Finally, the degree to which governments rely upon foreign economic aid is
found to relate strongly to the degree of marketization in pension systems. This result
lends credibility to the view that recipients of international aid exchange assistance for
domestic policyrnaking autonomy.
The results of this study might be better termed the beginnings of this research. They
have indicated several factors that independently shape the disposition of policy-makers
toward different models of pension reform. The task that lies ahead is to discover more
precisely how different combinations of political, social and economic factors shape
national responses to the search for social protection. The pension index created here is
intended as a first step in this direction. It is crudely measured and by far incomplete.
Nevertheless, the strength of variations revealed with this device suggests that there is some
utility in this line of research. As more data is generated from the continuing processes of
reform throughout Latin America and the world, it should be possible to test hypotheses
relating to the different combinations of domestic institutions and forces that together
generate the diversity of capitalisms unfolding in Latin America.
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